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Abstract
The rapid growth of online advertising has fueled the
growth of ad-blocking software, such as new ad-blocking and
privacy-oriented browsers or browser extensions. In response,
both ad publishers and ad networks are constantly trying to
pursue new strategies to keep up their revenues. To this end,
ad networks have started to leverage the Web Push technology
enabled by modern web browsers.
As web push notifications (WPNs) are relatively new,
their role in ad delivery has not been yet studied in depth.
Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent WPN ads are
being abused for malvertising (i.e., to deliver malicious
ads). In this paper, we aim to fill this gap. Specifically, we
propose a system called PushAdMiner that is dedicated to (1)
automatically registering for and collecting a large number
of web-based push notifications from publisher websites, (2)
finding WPN-based ads among these notifications, and (3)
discovering malicious WPN-based ad campaigns.
Using PushAdMiner, we collected and analyzed 21,541
WPN messages by visiting thousands of different websites.
Among these, our system identified 572 WPN ad campaigns,
for a total of 5,143 WPN-based ads that were pushed by a
variety of ad networks. Furthermore, we found that 51% of
all WPN ads we collected are malicious, and that traditional
ad-blockers and malicious URL filters are remarkably
ineffective against WPN-based malicious ads, leaving a
significant abuse vector unchecked.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, the rapid growth of online advertising
has fueled the growth of ad-blocking software, such as new
ad-blocking and privacy-oriented browsers (e.g., Brave [1])
or browser extensions (e.g., AdBlockPlus [2]). In response,
both ad publishers and ad networks are constantly trying to
pursue new strategies to keep up their revenues. To this end,
ad networks have started to leverage the Web Push technology
enabled by modern web browsers [3]. Until relatively
recently, push notifications were mostly limited to native apps
on mobile platforms, and web-based applications were unable
to connect to their users out of active browsing sessions.
However, now Web Push allows for web applications to send
out Web Push Notifications (WPN) at any time to re-engage
their users, even when the browser tab in which the web
application was running is closed (the browser itself needs
to be running, but does not need to be in the foreground
for a WPN to be delivered to the user). Furthermore, unlike
push notifications from native mobile apps, WPNs allow
for notifications to be displayed on both desktop and mobile
devices. Thus, they serve as a single tool with support to
reach users on multiple platforms.
Although WPNs were initially designed for websites to
deliver simple messages (e.g., news, weather alerts, etc.),
they have become an effective way to also serve online ads,
and can therefore be abused to also deliver malicious ads. In
particular, the use of WPNs for ad delivery has some unique
advantages. First, unlike traditional online ads (banner ads,
pop-up ads or pop-under ads), advertisers do not have to wait
for users to reach the web page that publishes the ad. Instead,
advertisers can send out notifications that can allure users to
their targeted content. Secondly, thanks to years of experience
with native mobile app notifications, users have been trained
to compulsively interact with push notification messages (at
least on mobile devices). WPN-based ads may also be less
prone to ad blindness [4], compared to traditional web ad
delivery mechanisms such as page banners. Furthermore,
ad-blocking software are not currently effective at blocking
WPN-based ads (see Section 6.4), in part because browser
extensions are not allowed to interfere with the Service
Workers code through which WPNs are delivered [5]. For
these reasons, some ad networks are focusing their business
specifically around WPN ads (e.g., RichPush [6]).
As WPNs are relatively new, their role in ad delivery has
not been yet studied in depth. Furthermore, it is unclear to
what extent WPN ads are being abused for malvertising (i.e.,
to deliver malicious ads). In this paper, we aim to fill this gap.
Specifically, we propose a system called PushAdMiner that is
dedicated to (1) automatically registering for and collecting
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a large number of web-based push notifications from
publisher websites, (2) finding WPN-based ads among these
notifications, and (3) discovering malicious WPN-based ad
campaigns. To build PushAdMiner, we significantly extend
the Chromium browser instrumentations developed by [7]
and [8], which have been open-sourced by the respective
authors. Specifically, neither [7] or [8] is able to track the
activities of Service Workers in detail. Therefore, we imple-
ment our own set of browser instrumentations that allows
us to track WPNs in all their aspects, from registration to
notification delivery, on both desktop and mobile devices. We
then build a custom WPN crawler around our instrumented
browser to automatically receive, track, and interact with
generic WPNs, including collecting malicious WPN ads and
their respective malicious landing pages. Finally, we develop
a data mining pipeline to analyze the collected WPNs and
discover malicious WPN-based campaigns.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first systematic
study that focuses on automatically collecting and analyzing
WPN-based ads and on discovering malicious ad campaigns
delivered via WPNs. In contrast, previous work focused
on other security-related aspects of Service Workers and
Push Notifications, such as building stealthy botnets [5], or
social engineering attacks that attempt to force users into
subscribing to push notifications [8] but without studying the
resulting push messages. Lee at al. [9] study Progressive Web
Apps. They collect Service Worker scripts from top-ranked
website homepages and analyze their push notifications.
Their work studies potential security vulnerabilities related
to Service Workers, App Cache, and discusses how push
notifications may be abused to launch phishing attacks,
without measuring how prevalent these attacks are in the wild.
Our work is different, in that we aim to automatically collect
and analyze WPN-based ads, to discover WPN ad campaigns,
and to measure the prevalence of malicious WPN-based ad
campaigns in the wild.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present PushAdMiner, a system that enables
the automated collection and analysis of online ads
delivered via web push notifications (WPNs) on both
desktop and mobile devices.
• To track WPNs, we significantly extend a Chromium-
based instrumented browser developed in [7, 8] to allow
for a detailed analysis of Service Workers, which are
at the basis of WPN deliveries. Furthermore, we build a
custom WPN crawler around our instrumented browser
to collect and automatically interact with WPNs.
• Using PushAdMiner, we collected and analyzed 21,541
WPN messages by visiting thousands of different
websites. Among these, our system identified 572
WPN ad campaigns, for a total of 5,143 WPN-based
ads that were pushed by a variety of ad networks.
Furthermore, we found that 51% of all WPN ads we
collected are malicious, and that traditional ad-blockers
and malicious URL filters are remarkably ineffective
against WPN-based malicious ads, leaving a significant
abuse vector unchecked.
2 Motivating Example and Background
In this section, we provide an example of WPN-based
malicious ad, and then briefly explain the concepts and
technologies behind web notification services.
2.1 Motivating Example
Figure 1 provides an example of malicious WPN-based ad.
During the preliminary stages of our research, we stumbled
upon a website on aurolog[.]ru. When visiting the main
page, the site requested permission to send us notifications.
We granted permission by pressing the Allow button on the
browser dialog box, and subsequently received a WPN ad
with the following alert message: “Your payment info has
been leaked” (see Figure 1). After clicking on the notification,
we were redirected to a tech support scam [10]. To our
surprise, the landing URL was neither blacklisted by Google
Safe Browsing [11] nor detected as malicious by any of
the web page scanners on Virus Total [12]. This example
confirmed our suspicion that WPNs may be abused for
malvertising, and sparked our investigation to determine
whether such cases of malicious WPN-based ads could be
automatically collected and analyzed.
2.2 Technical Background
Recent changes in HTML5 have introduced new web features,
such as Service Workers [13], Push Notifications [14] and App-
Cache [15]. Websites that adopt these technologies are called
Progressive Web Apps (PWAs). Throughout this paper, we
refer to push notifications sent by PWAs using a browser as
Web Push Notifications (WPN), to distinguish them from push
notifications sent by native apps on mobile devices.
Service Workers and Push Notifications: A Service Worker
is an event-driven script executed by the browser in the
background, separately from the main browser thread and
independently of the web application from which it was
initially registered and that it controls. In practice, a Service
Worker comes in the form of a JavaScript file that is registered
against the origin and path of the web page to which it is
associated (only HTTPS origins are allowed to register a
Service Worker). In effect, Service Workers can be viewed
as “a programmable network proxy that lets you control how
network requests from your page are handled” [16].
Service Workers can use the Push API [17] to receive
messages from a server, even while the associated web
application is not running. It is worth noting that a single
web app is allowed to register multiple Service Workers.
Service Workers can also use the Notifications API [14] to
display system notifications to the user. A prerequisite is that
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Figure 1: Example of malicious advertisement served through web push notifications
the web application must first request permission to display
notifications to the user (only allowed for HTTPS origins).
If the user accepts (i.e., clicks on “Allow” instead of “Block”
on the notification request popup) to receive notifications
from the web application’s origin, this permission persists
across browser restarts, and until the user explicitly revokes
the permission via browser settings/preferences (notice that
non-expert users may find it difficult to understand, find, and
disable notifications in the browser’s settings).
Web notification messages have a number of customizable
parameters, such as title, body, target URL, icon image,
display image and action buttons. The user can interact with
a notification by either clicking on it, closing it or performing
any custom actions displayed in the notification message.
Service Workers can listen to such user events and take
action according to the input. This includes loading the
notification’s target URL on a separate tab, following a user’s
click on the notification box. Therefore, push notifications
can also be conveniently used to deliver textual and graphical
ads, and the user can be redirected to the advertised product
page after clicking on the ad. A simplified illustration of how
ads are served via WPNs is shown in Figure 3(in Section 4).
Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM): FCM is a cross-
platform messaging solution for Push Notifications. It can
serve as a central authority that mediates the communication
between the ad server and the Service Worker. Upon initial
registration, FCM creates a unique registration ID per user
and per Service Worker, which is sent along with an endpoint
URL [18] to the ad server. For further details, we refer the
reader to FCM online documentation [19].
3 System Overview
In this section, we provide an overview of how PushAdMiner
works, leaving a detailed description of the main system’s
components to Sections 4 and 5. A high-level representation
of the system is provided in Figure 2.
PushAdMiner consists of three main components: (i) an in-
strumented browser to collect fine-grained information about
Service Workers and WPNs; (ii) a custom crawler that auto-
matically visits sites and interacts with the browser, including
granting notification permissions and interacting with WPNs
(Section 4); and (iii) a data analysis component aimed at
identifying WPN-based ad campaigns and labeling likely ma-
licious ones (Section 5).
While a number of browser automation and crawling
systems have been proposed, including Selenium [20],
Puppeteer [21], and others [7, 8, 22], currently they do not
fully support the automatic user interactions with WPNs and
collection of all details about Service Workers needed for
our study. We therefore built an instrumented browser based
on Google Chromium, by significantly extending existing
open-source Chromium instrumentations [7, 8]. In addition,
we leveraged Puppeteer [21] for browser automation and
event logging, and wrote custom scripts to record Service
Workers registrations and network requests. We plan to
release the source code of our system and the WPN messages
dataset collected for this study.
Figure 2 presents an overview of how PushAdMiner col-
lects information about WPNs, and how the browser logs are
analyzed to identify ad campaigns in general and discover ma-
licious ones among them. First, we start with a set of seed ad
networks that are known to specialize in ad delivery via WPNs.
Then, we rely on the publicwww.com engine to perform a
“reverse search” and find web pages that host Service Workers
code distributed by those ad networks. This process yields a
large set of web pages for crawling. After visiting these pages
using our instrumented browser, we automatically determine
which pages request permission to send us notifications. We
retain these pages for further analysis, and discard the others.
For the web pages that ask for notification permissions,
we log details about the responsible Service Worker code,
automatically grant permission (via browser code instru-
mentation), and then collect the notifications that are later
pushed to our instrumented browser. When a notification
is displayed by the browser, we record fine grained details
about the notification message itself (including message
text and icons), automatically simulate a user click on the
notification box (via browser code instrumentation), and track
all events resulting from the click. If the click results in a new
page being open, we record detailed information about the
related network requests, including all browser redirections,
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Figure 2: PushAdMiner System Overview
as well as detailed logs and a screenshot of each new page
the browser visits, including the landing page (i.e., the final
web page reached due to the click).
Finally, we extract relevant information from the detailed
logs of our instrumented browser, and apply a clustering
strategy to find notifications that are similar to each other,
which allows us to identify WPN-based ad campaigns. We
then leverage URL blacklists to find WPN ad campaigns
that are likely malicious (e.g., because one or more landing
pages are known to be malicious). This allows us to prioritize
the most suspicious WPN ad campaigns for further manual
analysis and labeling.
Note that in this paper we do not focus on building
a malicious WPN ad campaign detector, such as using
statistical features or machine learning classifiers. Rather, our
focus is on discovering, collecting, and analyzing WPN ad
campaigns in general, and on measuring the prevalence of
both benign and malicious campaigns. As we will show in
Section 6, URL blacklists tend to miss a significant number of
malicious URLs that we determine to be related to malicious
ad campaigns. The analysis we present in this paper could
therefore be used as a starting point for developing an
automated malicious WPN ad campaign detector. We leave
this latter task to future work.
3.1 Ethical Considerations
To track WPN-based ads and label malicious ones, it is
necessary to collect information about the landing page
that an ad eventually redirects to. For instance, for most
malicious ads the attack is effectively realized only once the
user reaches the landing page, especially in case of social
engineering and phishing attacks. As we do not know in
advance what landing page will be reached by clicking on
a WPN message, and whether a WPN ad is malicious or not,
our system will likely click on both legitimate and malicious
ads. In turn, this may cause legitimate advertisers to incur
a small cost for our clicks, as they will likely have to pay
a third-party publishing web page and ad network for their
services (notice that we obviously receive no monetary gain
whatsoever during this process). This is common to other
similar studies, such as [8, 23], and we therefore address the
ethical considerations for our study following previous work.
To make sure we do not have a significant negative impact
on legitimate third-parties, we estimated the cost incurred by
these advertisers due to ad clicks performed by our system,
and found that our system has minimal impact on advertisers.
Specifically, among the WPN ads we identified, we consider
legitimate ads to be those whose landing pages are not labeled
as malicious by Virus Total’s URL classification services.
Then, we estimate the cost per landing domain based on the
number of ads we clicked on that lead to a specific domain,
using the Cost Per Mille (CPM) [24] for push notification
ads according to iZooto [25]. The maximum cost per landing
domain throughout our entire study was USD 1.12$ (due to
landing on the same domain 444 times), which we calculated
using the standard CPM of USD 2.54$. On average, we
visited each landing domain 18 times, which corresponds
to an average cost of USD 0.04$ per landing domain (i.e.,
per advertiser). Considering these low values, we believe the
impact of our system on advertisers is not significant, and
is on par with previous work [8, 23].
4 Data Collection Module
In this section, we describe in detail how PushAdMiner’s
data collection modules work. The steps referred to in the
following sections follow the numbering given in Figure 3.
4.1 Desktop Environment
To discover WPN ad campaigns, we first need to collect
WPN messages. To this end, we build a crawler consisting
of an instrumented browser and browser automation scripts.
As our crawler encounters a website that asks for permission
to send push notifications, our goal is to automatically allow
the permission request, so that we can collect notification
from that origin. To this end, we instrumented our browser as
follows: we introduce changes to the RequestPermission
and PermissionDecided methods under the Permission-
ContextBase class in Chromium’s C++ code base, to log
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all details about the permission request (e.g., the origin
requesting it) and to automatically grant permissions.
Service WorkerRegistration (step 2): To record when
a Service Worker is registered by a web page, we use a
custom script for Puppeteer [21]. Specifically, we listen to
serviceworkercreated events and log information such as
details about the page that registered the Service Worker, and
the URL from which the Service Worker code was retrieved.
Once the Service Worker has been registered, it can subscribe
for push notifications. During this subscription process, a
server API key is passed to the browser, to identify the server
that will be responsible for sending push notification via the
FCM (see Section 2). We log the API key information by
listening for PushManager.subscribe events.
Network Requests (step 3): When the browser receives a
push message from the FCM service, it will alert the Service
Worker to which the message is destined. The correct Service
Worker is identified via a unique ID included in the push
message. As part of handling the push message and related no-
tification, the Service Worker may issue one or more network
requests directly to an ad network server or other third-party
servers. For instance, the Service Worker may contact an ad
network server to determine the landing URL associated to a
given push message. Also, after a pushed notification receives
a user click, the Service Worker may send a network requests
to an ad server to notify it of the user click, or to facilitate
other tracking related activities. We capture and log such
network requests issued by Service Workers by leveraging
a custom Puppeteer [21] script that listens to Service Worker
request and response events. Specifically, for every
Service Worker’s network request we record information
such as the requested URL, the data sent/received, possible
network redirections, and the related response content.
Notifications (steps 5-6): Notifications are displayed by
invoking showNotification under ServiceWorkerRegis-
trationNotifications (in Chromium’s C++ code). We
therefore add an instrumentation hook to record calls to that
method. Specifically, we log the URL of the Service Worker
that called for showing the notification, the notification title,
body, icon URL, and target URL (if present).
Notification Clicks and Navigations (steps 7-8): Depending
on the type of notification, clicking on it can navigate the
browser to a new web page (e.g., on a separate tab). For
WPN-based ads, clicking on the notification box typically
takes the user to the page advertised in the WPN ad (i.e.,
the ad’s landing page). Collecting such pages is especially
important for studying malicious WPN ads, because the
landing page often implements a critical component of the
attack. For instance, Figure 1 shows that the user reaches
the actual tech support scam page after clicking on the
notification. The landing page advertises the scam phone
number, without which the attack could not be monetized.
To automate the process of collecting the landing page
Service Worker
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Figure 3: Steps involved in Serving Ads via WPNs
associated to push notification messages, we need to simulate
a user click. Unfortunately, browser automation frameworks
such as Puppeteer [21] and Selenium [20] do not allow for
interacting with WPNs. Therefore, we again had to build
our own custom browser instrumentation. Specifically, we
found that Chromium uses the Add method in Message-
CenterNotificationManager (in the C++ code base) to
trigger the display of a notification. Also, we found that
WebNotificationDelegate has a method called Click that
is responsible for propagating user clicks to the notification.
Therefore, to simulate a user click we instrument the Add
method mentioned above so that, after the notification is dis-
played, it waits for a short delay (e.g., a few seconds) and then
calls WebNotificationDelegate::Click. If the Click
call results in a web page navigation, our browser records all
network requests involved in the process (including all redi-
rections) and fine-grained details about the rendering of the
landing page, which includes detailed information about any
JavaScript code executed in the context of the landing page.
The Service Worker responsible for the notification may also
listen to the click event and may respond by closing the no-
tification shown and contacting a server to report that a click
occurred. We also record all these events and interactions.
4.2 Mobile Environment
We also developed a version of PushAdMiner for Android.
Due to some technical differences between how WPNs are
displayed on a mobile OS, compared to desktop environments,
we had to adapt some of the system components to run
specifically on Android. First, at the time when we started
building our system Puppeteer [21] did not appear to support
Android Chromium automation. Only recently there have
been online posts in which Puppeteer users describe how they
have been able to “hack” their configurations to remotely
control an Android browser. We therefore built our own
browser automation framework that works via the Android
Debug Bridge (ADB). The capabilities of our ADB-based
automation framework are limited, but sufficient for enabling
data collection for PushAdMiner. We will explore the use of
Puppeteer for PushAdMiner on Android in future work.
Logging Internal Browser Events: We compile our
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instrumented Chromium browser for Android, so that we
can collect intimate details about internal browser events
related to WPNs, including recording information about the
related Service Workers and the rendering of the landing page
resulting from clicking on a WPN. Browser logs are sent via
the logcat ADB command to a remote logging machine.
Interacting with Notifications: Unlike on desktop devices,
in which WPN messages are displayed by the browser, on
Android device it is Android OS that displays a WPN as a
system notification. Also, unlike on desktop environments,
the browser does not need to be activated for a WPN message
to be received, though the browser may be activated after tap-
ping on a notification (e.g., to navigate to the URL pointed to
by the notification). We therefore had to implement a different
mechanism to simulate user interactions with WPNs on An-
droid. Specifically, we developed an Android application that
leverages Android’s accessibility service. The accessibility
service is aimed to help people with disabilities in using the
device and apps. It is a long-running privileged system service
that helps users process information from the screen and lets
them interact with the content meaningfully in an easy way.
Android developers can leverage the accessibility service API
and develop apps that are made aware of certain events, such
as TYPE_VIEW_FOCUSED and TYPE_NOTIFICATION_STATE_-
CHANGED. Furthermore, the accessibility service API can also
be used to initiate user actions such as click, touch and swipe.
We install our app with accessibility service permission
on an Android physical device, and use it to interact with
every notification event fired by our instrumented Chromium
browser. Whenever a new notification pops up, our application
will automatically swipe down the notification bar and click
on the notification to complete the action, while our instru-
mented Android browser produces detailed logs about the con-
sequences of such interactions (e.g., loading a new web page).
5 Data Analysis Module
In this section, we first explain in detail how we mine the col-
lected WPN messages to identify WPN-based ad campaigns,
and later explain how we label malicious campaigns.
5.1 WPN-based Ad Campaigns
To identify WPN-based ad campaigns, we mine the dataset of
WPN messages collected by PushAdMiner from a large and
diverse set of websites. To distinguish between generic WPN
messages and WPN-based ads, we start by considering the
following intuitions. Roughly speaking, advertisers tend to
promote their products or services on multiple websites, and
clicking on a WPN notification typically leads to a third-party
landing page, on a different origin than the website from
which the WPN message was received. On the other hand,
non-ad WPN messages are typically related to alerts (e.g.,
breaking news, weather alerts, etc.) that are specific to the
notifying website itself, and clicking on the notification often
leads to the same origin to which the notification was related.
Following the above intuitions, we broadly define a
WPN ad campaign as a set of WPN messages from multiple
sources that deliver similar content promoting the same (or
similar) products or services. In practice, this translates into
a (potentially large) group of similar WPN messages pushed
by multiple different websites that lead to the same landing
page, or different landing pages that show similar content.
To find such WPN ad campaigns among a large collection
of generic WPN messages, we leverage a document clustering
approach. This clustering process aims to group together
WPN messages that are similar to each other in terms of
message content and landing page. As a result, WPN ads
that belong to a large WPN ad campaign will tend to form
larger clusters. On the other hand, non-ad WPNs would tend
to be isolated into singleton clusters or clusters that contain
messages related to only one source website and a landing
domain that points back to the source website itself.
Because clustering is an unsupervised learning process, it
is usually challenging to tune the hyperparameters to obtain
perfect clustering results. Therefore, to minimize the chances
of grouping together ads and non-ads, we tune our clustering
system to be conservative and yield “tight” clusters. Namely,
WPN messages assigned to the same cluster will exhibit high
similarity. Although this may result in some WPN ads being
left out of the campaign (i.e., the cluster) they may also belong
to, we will see later that we can reconnect them to their respec-
tive campaigns using a meta-clustering step (Section 5.3).
5.1.1 WPN Clustering Features and Approach
To cluster similar WPNs, we first need to define the features
to be compared and a similarity function that calculates the
closeness of two WPN messages. Thanks to our instrumented
browser, each WPN we collect is accompanied by metadata
such as the notification title, message body, the images and
icons found in the WPN, the URL of the landing page, a
screenshot of the landing page reached after clicking on the
WPN (in the case of our desktop browser), the events that
occur immediately after a notification click, etc.
Among the above features, to discover WPN ad campaigns
we use the following ones for clustering: message title,
message body, and the URL path (i.e., we exclude the domain
name) of the message’s landing page URL. We then use these
features to calculate the pairwise distance between WPN
messages. Specifically, given two messages, we compute
the distance between their title and body text, and separately
the distance between their landing URL paths. Then, we
compute the total distance between two WPNs as the average
of these two distances. We explain the distance measures in
more detail below. The remaining information contained in
the WPN metadata collected by our browser (e.g., domain
names, screenshots, etc.) that are not used as features will
instead be used later to help us validate the clustering results.
WPN Messages Distance: The text contained in the title
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and body of a WPN message is typically short and includes
specific keywords that reflect the theme of the message. To
measure the similarity between these short pieces of text (the
concatenation of title and body), we require a measure that
gives importance to significant keywords found in the content
of WPNs. To this end, we use the soft cosine similarity [26]
measure, which considers the semantic relationship between
words. To compute the similarity between words, we first
use Word2Vec [27] on all WPN messages to obtain a
term-similarity matrix. We then convert each WPN message
into a bag-of-words representation, and input both the term-
similarity matrix and the bag-of-word vectors for each pair
of WPN messages into the cosine similarity function (we use
softcossim() implemented in gensim [28]) to obtain a pair-
wise similarity matrix for WPN messages. Since the similarity
value s∈ [0,1], we calculate the distance as d=(1−s).
URL Paths Distance: Given the landing page URL of
a WPN (which we collect along with other metadata, as
explained earlier), we extract the URL path by excluding the
domain name and the query string values, while retaining the
relative path to the page and query string parameter names.
To calculate the distance between two URL paths, we use
the Jaccard distance between tokens extracted from the URL
path, such as the components of the directory path, the page
name, and the name of the query string parameters.
WPN Clustering: Once the pairwise distances are computed,
we use agglomerative hierarchical clustering over the distance
matrix. To determine where to cut the resulting dendogram,
we compute the average silhouette score [29] for clustering
results obtained at different cuts, and choose the cut with the
highest score. We refer to the result as WPN clusters.
WPN Ad Campaigns: As per our definition of WPN ad
campaigns, to determine if a WPN cluster is formed by ads,
we take into consideration the source of the WPNs. Namely,
we count the number of effective second-level domain names
associated with the websites that sent the push notifications
per each cluster. This number tells us if the WPNs have been
published on multiple sources. If a cluster contains more than
one distinct second-level source website domain, we label
the cluster as an WPN ad campaign.
5.2 Identifying Malicious WPN Clusters
To determine the maliciousness of a WPN cluster, we
leverage two well-known URL blacklisting services: Google
Safe Browsing(GSB) [11] and Virus Total [12] (VT). We
submit the full URLs of all the landing pages reached from
all WPN messages in the cluster to these services. Then, we
label a particular WPN message as known malicious if the
landing page URL is blacklisted as malicious by any of the
blacklisting services. Next, we use a simple label propagation
policy to flag as malicious the WPN clusters that contain at
least one known malicious WPN.
It is worth noting that we submit full URLs to GSB and
VT. If a full URL, u, is blacklisted, it does not necessarily
mean that all URLs under the same domain name as u will
also be blacklisted (in fact, we found some cases that confirm
this observation for VT). In addition, similar malicious WPN
messages often lead to different domain names, mainly as
an attempt to evade blocking by URL blacklists. At the same
time, because WPN messages in the same cluster are very sim-
ilar, thanks to our conservative clustering approach, they share
very similar title, body, and structure of the landing page URL
path. Intuitively, if one WPN message is known to lead to a
malicious landing page, it is highly likely that all other WPN
messages in the same cluster also lead to similar malicious
pages, as we will also discuss in our measurement results
(see Section 6). That is why we rely on the simple “guilty by
association” policy mentioned above for label propagation.
5.3 WPN Meta Clustering
Because URL blacklists have limited coverage, it is possible
that some malicious WPN clusters will not be immediately
identified using the labeling approach discussed above.
Furthermore, because our clustering approach is conservative,
it is possible that separate clusters of WPN messages may
in fact be related to each other. To compensate for this, we
perform a meta-clustering step that aims to group together
WPN clusters that may belong to the same WPN “operation”
(e.g., the same advertiser), as explained below.
To this end, we generate a bipartite graph G=(W,D,E). W
is a set of nodes in which each node represents a WPN cluster
obtained as described in Section 5.1.1. D is the set of all
domains pointed to by the WPN messages we collected (i.e.,
all domains related to any of the landing page URLs found
in the WPN messages), and E is a set of edges in which each
edge connects a node w∈W to a node d∈D. In other words,
we connect each WPN cluster to the domains related to the
landing page URLs linked by the WPN messages in the clus-
ter. Then, we find all isolated components, G1,G2,...,Gm∈G ,
and consider each isolated component as a meta cluster of
WPN messages. Notice that this leads us to groups of WPN
clusters that are related to each other because they collectively
share common landing page domains. Figure 6 in Appendix A
visually shows two examples of such meta clusters.
5.4 Labeling WPN Meta Clusters
First, we consider as suspicious all domain names associated
with full URLs that have been previously labeled as malicious
by GSB or VT. Then, let Gi ∈ G be a meta cluster that
includes one or more of such suspicious domains. We label
WPN clusters in Gi (and thus all WPN messages in those
clusters) as suspicious, unless they were previously labeled as
malicious according to the process described in Section 5.2.
In addition, given a meta cluster Gi, if it contains at least
one WPN cluster w j ∈W that we previously identified as a
WPN ad campaign (see Section 5.1), we consider all WPN
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messages contained in the WPN clusters within Gi as WPN
ads. This is because those WPN messages point to domain
names related to WPN-based advertising, since they are
linked to one or more WPN ad clusters, and thus are highly
likely WPN-based ad messages themselves.
To identify additional suspicious WPN ad campaigns that
were not previously labeled based on the process described
above and in Section 5.2, we proceed as follows. We notice
that ad networks such as Google Ads and Bing Ads recom-
mend advertisers not to promote the same product, brand, or
similar customer experience by redirecting users to multiple
destination websites. Violating this policy is referred to as
Abuse of Ad Network by Google Ads [30] and Duplicate Ads
by Bing Ads [31]. Besides the fact that these practices do not
conform to advertising policies, malicious advertisers often
prefer hosting similar malicious content on multiple domains
to evade detection and to continue the attack even if one of
their domains is blacklisted. We then identify such practices
and label the related meta-clusters that lead to multiple
different landing domains as suspicious, to trigger further
(manual) analysis. We provide a detailed measurements on
the identified suspicious WPN ads in Section 6.3.3.
Manual Verification: To validate the malicious labels as-
signed by leveraging URL blacklists, and to measure the num-
ber of suspicious WPN clusters that are in fact malicious, we
manually analyze all malicious and suspicious WPN clusters
discovered by our data analysis module. During manual analy-
sis, we consider multiple factors to determine if the WPNs are
indeed malicious. Once we manually confirm that a WPN clus-
ter is malicious, we add it to a manual blacklist, which we then
use to inform the measurement results presented in Section 6.
Some of the factors considered during manual blacklisting
are as follows. We recognize a WPN message as malicious if
it meets a combination of the following conditions: (1) leads
to a landing page visually similar to a known malicious page
(as determined by GSB and VT); (2) contains the same WPN
message as a known malicious WPN message, but leads to
a different product/site (i.e., a different landing page); (3)
includes message content that is highly likely malicious or
leads to a page with likely malicious content such as rewards
that clearly seem too good to be true, as is typical of survey
scams [32], false financial alerts, etc.; or (4) leads to a landing
page that shares several domain-related properties with known
malicious sites, such as IP address, registrant, very similar
domain name, etc. We further discuss our manual analysis
process by presenting some examples in Section 6.3.2.
6 Measuring WPN Ads in the Wild
In this section, we report measurements on the usage of
WPNs as an ad delivery platform, and provide insights into
the malicious use of WPN ads.
6.1 Data Collection Setup
We first describe PushAdMiner’s setup for harvesting
in-the-wild WPN messages for both desktop and mobile
environments. Because our internal browser instrumentations
are implemented by extending the browser code provided
by [8], our data collection process leverages Chroumium’s
code base version 64.0.3282.204, which we built for both
Linux and Android environments. As mentioned earlier, we
plan to release the source code of our system, along with the
WPN messages dataset collected for this study.
6.1.1 Seeding the WPN Crawler
Our main goal is to setup the WPN data collection system
to maximize our chances of collecting WPN-based ads, so
that we can measure their properties and discover abuse. To
this end, we first identify a seed set of popular advertisement
networks that support push notification advertisements.
Specifically, by manually performing online searches and
reading articles and forums dedicated to advertising online,
we manually discovered 15 popular ad networks that provide
push advertisement services. We registered an account with 9
of these ad networks to obtain the JavaScript code that needs
to be embedded in an ad-publishing websites to include the
ad networks’ Service Workers that will control their push
notifications requests. We then used the publicwww.com
code search engine to find websites (i.e., URLs) that likely
embed the identified ad network’s code. The code search
engine, publicwww.com itself provides a list of ad networks
to search keywords mappings [33], which we leveraged to
obtain URLs of websites that likely embedded ads from the
remaining 6 seed ad networks of interest, without the need to
register an account with those networks as well. The list of 15
seed ad networks we discovered this way is shown in Table 1.
In addition to the search keywords related to the 15
ad networks mentioned above, we further used generic
keywords that potentially indicate that a web page employs
the Push Notifications: NotificationrequestPermission,
pushmanagersubscribe, addEventListener(’Push’,
adsblockkpushcom. Thus, overall we obtained a list
of 19 code search keywords to be used for searches on
publicwww.com that are likely to lead to URLs that make use
of push notifications. Table 1 provides a count of the HTTPS
URLs found via publicwww.com for each ad network and
generic WPN-related keyword.
As a result of the above search, we were able to gather a
total of 87,622 HTTPS URLs of potential WPN ad publishing
web pages. These URLs were hosted on 82,566 distinct
second-level domain names. We use this set of URLs as seed
for PushAdMiner’s WPN message crawlers. Notice that there
is no guarantee that the sites we crawl will in fact lead us to
registering for and receiving WPN-based ads. Rather, only
a subset of these web pages will actually request notification
permissions. Therefore, we visited each URL and retained
only those that actually make a request for a notification
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permission. Then, we used PushAdMiner to automatically
grant notification permission requests on those URLs. As
shown in the last column of Table 1, overall we identified
5,849 URLs hosted on 5,697 distinct second-level domains
that issued a notification permission request.
6.1.2 Collecting WPNs in a Desktop Environment
To automatically harvest WPN advertisements at a large scale,
we leverage Docker containers [34] to launch several parallel
instances of our instrumented browser-based crawlers. We
observe that a few ad networks use cookies or other infor-
mation to track the device or web browser across browsing
sessions. To mitigate this and increase the chances of being
presented with notification permission requests from as many
sources as possible, we create a separate docker container
for each URL we visit. During our experiments, we used four
different Ubuntu 16.04 Linux machines having between 8
to 32 CPU cores and 64 to 128 GB of memory each, running
a total of 20 to 50 docker sessions in parallel at a time. For
each seed URL that issues a notification permission request,
we start the monitoring phase described below.
Every time we visit a URL, we wait 5 minutes to make
sure the website has sufficient time to present our browser
with a notification request. Once a permission request is
received and automatically granted by a browser instance,
a Service Worker is registered. If a Service Worker was
registered, we keep the related Docker container alive for
an additional 15 minutes, to allow the browser to receive the
first (or more than one) WPN message from the visited URL.
To select this 15 minutes threshold, we first performed pilot
experiments with much longer waiting times (up to 96 hours)
for a large subset of URLs (1,425 URLs, to be precise), and
observed that 98% of them sent their first notification within
15 minutes of when the permission was first granted.
Given a container, and therefore a browser instance that
granted notification permissions to a specific URL, after the
first 15 minutes of its life we suspend the container to free
up resources for instantiating a new container that will visit
a new URL. However, we periodically resume suspended
containers to see if they will receive additional notifications,
which are queued in the FCM and sent to the browser as it
comes back online.
6.1.3 Collecting WPNs in Mobile Environment
During our study, we found that WPN messages sent to mo-
bile devices tended to be somewhat different that the ones col-
lected by desktop browsers, in that they were more tailored to
mobile users. In particular, malicious mobile WPN messages
included fake missed call notifications, fake amber alerts,
“spoofed” Gmail or WhatsApp notifications, fake FedEx no-
tifications, etc. In addition, we found that these malicious
messages were much more likely to appear on real Android de-
vices, rather than emulated environments (likely due to some
form of emulator detection). Therefore, to automatically col-
Table 1: URLs and Notification Permission Request counts
Ad Network URLs NPRs
Ad-Maven 49,769 1,168
PushCrew 15,177 427
OneSignal 11,317 2,933
PopAds 1,582 73
PushEngage 796 215
iZooto 676 278
PubMatic 647 7
PropellerAds 335 9
Criteo 154 5
AdsTerra 115 2
AirPush 52 0
HillTopAds 21 3
RichPush 12 0
AdCash 10 0
PushMonetization 9 5
Generic Keywords URLs NPRs
NotificationrequestPermission 3,965 538
pushmanagersubscribe 2,667 158
addEventListener(’Push’ 263 9
adsblockkpushcom 55 19
Total 87,622 5,849
lect mobile WPN messages we instrumented a real mobile de-
vice. Specifically, we used a Google Nexus 5 device with 2 GB
of RAM and a 1080×1920 pixels display. The Android ver-
sion we used was aosp_shamu-userdebug7.1.1N6F26Y.
As we attempted to scale our PushAdMiner’s mobile WPN
crawlers on a real device, we identified two challenges. First,
Docker or other container techniques do not support Android,
and therefore we cannot easily visit multiple URLs in parallel
with isolated browsing sessions. Second, we considered to
use app cloning techniques [35] to open multiple browser
instances separately in isolated execution environments.
However, the limited computing power of our mobile device
restricted us to scale up the experiments and visit a large
number of URLs simultaneously. Therefore, we decided to
open multiple URLs in one chromium app but in separate tabs.
While we might miss some advertisements that use device or
web browser tracking techniques, we found that the number
of WPNs we were able to collect from each registered Service
Worker is 3.5 times more than the desktop environment on av-
erage. In addition, we disable third party cookies, data saver,
and other options that might interfere with our data collection.
Table 2: Measurement Results of Data analysis Module
WPNs
with
Landing
Pages
WPN
Ad
Campaigns
WPN
Ads
Malicious
WPN Ad
Campaigns
Malicious
WPN
Ads
Desktop 9,570
572 5143 318 2615Mobile 2,692
Total 12,262
6.2 WPN Messages Dataset
We start with the 5,849 initial URLs that we collected as
explained in Section 6.1.1, over 5,697 distinct second-level
domain names. By clicking on WPN messages issued by these
initial URLs, we collect an additional 10,898 URLs across
2,269 distinct second-level domains. When visited, many of
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these additional URLs presented our browser with a notifi-
cation request, which our crawler automatically granted. This
brought us to a total of 7,951 URLs that registered a Service
Worker with Push permission and were therefore able to push
notifications to our instrumented browser instances over time.
During the course of about two months (September and
October 2019), we were able to collect a total of 21,541 push
notification messages, including 12,441 notifications for the
desktop environment and 9,100 for the mobile environment.
PushAdMiner interacted with each of these WPN messages.
However, not all automated clicks on notification boxes
led to a separate landing page. In addition, some landing
pages appeared to cause a crash in the browser’s tab (but
not the overall browser) in which they rendered, preventing
us from collecting detailed information on those pages (this
was likely due to the fact that our instrumented Chromium
browser is not based on the most recent stable code base). We
filtered out these notifications, because we could not collect
sufficient details about the related landing pages, leaving us
with 12,262 WPN messages (9,570 on desktop and 2,692 on
mobile) that when clicked on lead to a valid landing page.
We then used this final set of WPN messages in the clustering
process described in Section 5.
6.3 Data Analysis Results
Summary of findings: Table 2 summarizes the overall
results of our analysis process. From the 12,262 WPN
messages mentioned above, PushAdMiner identified 572
WPN ad campaigns and a total of 5,143 WPN ads related to
these campaigns. Moreover, PushAdMiner identified 51% of
all WPN ads as malicious. Specifically, PushAdMiner found
318 (out of 572) campaigns to be malicious; in aggregate,
these malicious campaigns included 2,615 WPN ads.
This is quite a staggering result, in that it appears that ad net-
works that provide WPN ad services are heavily abused to dis-
tribute malicious content. Later, in Section 6.4, we also show
that ad blockers are ineffective at blocking such ads, which
is an additional cause of concern. In the following sections,
we discuss the clustering and labeling results in more details.
6.3.1 WPN Clusters and Ad Campaigns
As discussed in section 5.1.1, we cluster the collected WPN
messages based on their message content and landing page
information. After clustering 12,262 WPN messages that
led to a valid landing page, we obtained 8,780 WPN clusters,
of which 7,731 were singleton clusters containing only one
element (i.e., only one WPN message). Of the remaining non-
singleton clusters, 572 were labeled as WPN ad campaigns,
according to the process described in Section 5. In aggregate,
these WPN ad campaigns pushed 3,213 WPN ad messages
to our browsers, during a period of about two months. We
now provide a few examples of WPN clusters, and discuss
what type of WPNs tend to fall within singleton clusters.
Figure 4 provides some examples of WPN clusters. Cluster
WPN-C1 consists of 40 WPNs that advertise free giveaways
and prizes, which we found led to pages requesting users to
complete surveys or provide detailed personal information
to claim the offer (this is a typical survey scam campaign,
as discussed in Section 6.3.2). WPN-C2 consists of 12 WPN
messages that alert users about a large increase in their
Paypal account balance. These WPN messages led to pages
that offer users to claim their money after providing personal
information (another form of scam). In both WPN-C1 and
WPN-C2, the respective WPNs were pushed from multiple
sources (i.e., multiple second-level domain names), as also
shown in Figure 4.
WPN-C3 included 4 identical WPN messages pushed by a
single source website, a bank, alerting users on their loan
offers. These messages appear to be legitimate, and led back
to the site that pushed them. WPN-C4 is an example of WPN
message isolated into a singleton cluster. This message was
isolated during the clustering process because they carry dif-
ferent content and/or led to different URL paths, compared to
other WPN messages.
According to the definition provided in Section 5, we
label WPN-C1 and WPN-C2 as WPN ad campaigns, because
the WPNs in each of the clusters deliver very similar (or
the same) message promoting very similar products from
multiple sources. However, WPN-C3 and WPN-C4 do not meet
the definition and are thus not labeled as WPN ad campaign.
6.3.2 Malicious WPN Ad Campaigns
As described in Section 5.2, we submit landing page URLs
related to all WPN messages to GSB [11] and VT [12]. On
our initial scan, less than 1% of the URLs were detected as
malicious by GSB or VT, in aggregate. For instance, initially
VT flagged 108 landing page URLs as malicious, of which
88 were related to WPN messages labeled by our system as
belonging to ad campaigns. Notice that for VT we consider
a URL as malicious if at least one of the URL detection
engine reports it as malicious, and later manually review all
results to filter out possible false positives. After one month,
we submitted the same set of URLs once again, and we
found that 1,388 (11.31%) of them were then detected by VT,
though GSB still only flagged 1% of them.
PushAdMiner relies on label propagation to label WPN
messages and clusters as malicious, based on results from VT
and GSB, as explained in Section 5.2. To limit the chances
of amplifying possible false positives from VT and GSB, we
manually verified all 1,388 URLs to check whether they ac-
tually led to malicious content. We were able to confirm that
96.8% of them indeed appeared to be malicious. Of the re-
maining 44 URLs that we could not confirm as malicious,
13 were found to belong to popular benign domains such as
bing.com, kbb.com, tophatter.com, etc.; 24 URLs were
related to unpopular blog/news sites; 3 led to adult websites;
and 4 led to websites hosting non-English content that we
could not verify. Given that these sites may be benign, since
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[Sample Landing Pages]
[Domains]
surveysandpromotionusa.com
surveysandpromotionusa.com
…
signup.ourdailysweepstakes.com
[URL Paths]
/Flow isPrepop reward subaff1
/Flow isPrepop reward subaff1
…
/Flow isPrepop reward subaff1
[Sample Notifications]
(a) WPN-C1: consists of 40 WPNs
[Sample Landing Pages]
[Domains]
awakenfeedback.com
benehai.com
…
nodilax.com
[URL Paths]
/spin/ caid trsid o tar isp language 
amt cep Iptoken
/jackpot/ caid trsid o tar isp language 
amt cep Iptoken
…
/lucky-number/ caid trsid o tar isp language 
amt cep Iptoken
[Sample Notifications]
(b) WPN-C2: consists of 12 WPNs
[Landing Page]
[Domain]
www.hdfc.com
[URL Path]
/campaign/ web_notifications
utm_source utm_medium
[Notification]
(c) WPN-C3: consists of 4 identical WPNs
[Landing Page]
[Domain]
hobii.com
[URL Path]
/exciting-things/ c847frk-olsens-
efterarsrengoring utm_medium
utm_source
[Notification]
(d) WPN-C4: consists of 1 WPN
…
1 2
40
1
2
…
1 2 12
12
1
2
zip-foreclosures.com
1
2
zip-hudhomes.com
…
zip-hudhomes.com
40
40
www.hdfc.com
hobii.com
awakenfeedback.com
mueanca.com
1
2
12
…
nodilax.com
Figure 4: Examples of WPN clusters
we do not have all the information VT and GSB had to label
them as malicious we take a conservative stance and remove
the malicious label from them. Accordingly, we label 1,344
WPNs as known malicious. Among them, 758 WPNs were
part of 572 WPN clusters that we previously classified as
ad campaigns (see Section 6.3.1). The remaining 586 WPN
messages that led to malicious landing pages were not imme-
diately found to belong to WPN ad clusters, as they formed
separate small clusters. We will determine whether they are
related to WPN campaigns later, in Section 6.3.3) after the
meta-clustering step (explained in Section 5.3).
Table 3: Measurement Results at Stages of Clustering
# clusters # ad-relatedclusters
# WPN
ads
# known
malicious ads
# additional
malicious ads
After WPN
Clustering 8780 572 3213 758 367
After Meta
Clustering 2046 224 1930 210 1280
Total: 5143 968 1647
By using a “guilty by association” label propagation policy,
as explained in Section 5.2, we label WPN ad campaigns as
malicious if they include at least one known malicious WPN
(remember that this policy is justified by the close similarity
in content and landing page URL path between messages in
the same cluster). This yielded 152 (out of 572) malicious
WPN ad campaigns, which overall included 376 WPN (or
more precisely their landing pages) that GSB or VT missed
to detect as malicious. After manually inspecting these 376
WPN ads, we were able to confirm that 367 of them are in-
deed malicious ads that lead to survey scams, phishing pages,
scareware, fake alerts, social media scams, etc. We were not
able to confirm the maliciousness of the remaining 9 ads (i.e.,
2.4%) that led to different pages that welcome/thank the user
for subscribing to the notification all hosted on the same IP ad-
dress. The take away from the above discussion is that, using
our WPN clustering approach, we were able to increase the
number of confirmed malicious WPN ads from 758 to 1,125
(i.e., 758 plus 367), which represents an increase of about
50%. The above results are summarized in Table 3, first row.
Referring back to the examples provided in Figure 4, in
cluster WPN-C1, 35 out of the 40 WPNs were labeled as
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known malicious WPNs, according to VT. As mentioned
earlier, PushAdMiner labeled this entire cluster as malicious.
After manually inspecting all 40 messages, we confirmed that
the remaining 5 messages in the cluster were indeed related
to the 35 malicious sweepstakes/survey scam ads.
6.3.3 Finding Suspicious Ads
So far, we have leveraged the labels provided by VT and GSB
to identify malicious WPN ads, and label WPN ad campaigns.
Unfortunately, both URL blacklists suffer from significant
false negatives, when it comes to detecting malicious landing
pages reached from WPN ads. As an example, consider
cluster WPN-C2, which PushAdMiner identifies as an ad
campaign. This cluster contains 12 WPNs; none of which
were labeled as known malicious according to VT. However,
PushAdMiner flags this cluster as suspicious since it contains
’Duplicate Ads’ and via manual inspection we found that the
WPN messages in this cluster display fake PayPal alerts that
lead users to survey scam pages; therefore, we manually label
the entire WPN-C2 cluster as malicious. This example demon-
strates the gaps left by current URL blacklisting services, and
how ineffective they could be if they were used to detect and
block malicious ad notifications. Below we discuss how we
use the meta-clustering approach explained in Section 5.4
to automatically identify and label more of such cases.
As described in Section 5.3, we apply a meta-clustering
method to group WPN clusters that may relate to each other,
as they share common landing page domains. To this end,
we create a bipartite graph G =(W,D,E), here W is the set
of all 8,780 WPN clusters we previously obtained, and D
is the set of all 2,177 distinct landing page domains pointed
to by WPN ads that we were able to record. By identifying
and separating the connected components in this bipartite
graph, we identify 2,046 WPN meta clusters. Of these, 224
contain a mix of WPN clusters that we previously labeled as
ad campaign and other non-campaign WPN clusters. We then
label all WPN messages contained in these 224 ad-related
meta-cluster as WPN ads, thus increasing the number of WPN
ads identified so far from 3,213 to 5,143. More specifically,
let Gi=(Wi,Di,Ei) be a connected component subgraph of G .
If at least one WPN cluster wk ∈Wi was previously labeled
as WPN ad campaign (see Section 5.1), we label the entire
meta-cluster Gi as ad-related, and thus consider all WPN
messages contained in the union of cluster
⋃
kwk as WPN ads.
Figure 6 provides two examples of meta clusters, which are
discussed in Appendix A, due to space constraints.
Next, we consider all yet to be labeled WPN messages in
a WPN meta cluster as suspicious if the meta cluster contains
at least one malicious WPN cluster or if it contains duplicate
ad domains, as defined in Section 5.4. Out of the 572 WPN
ad campaigns identified earlier, we found that 255 of them
contained duplicate ad domains. Accordingly, we were able to
label a total of 287 out of 2,046 WPN meta clusters as suspi-
cious. Further, we identified 166 (out of 572) additional WPN
ad campaigns, which were not previously labeled malicious
in the previous step, as suspicious. Overall, this translates
into 1,479 suspicious WPN ads, as shown in Table 3. Fol-
lowing our manual verification process, we confirmed 1,280
(86.5%) of these ads as malicious. The remaining 199 WPN
ads were flagged by PushAdMiner because they were related
to duplicate ad domains. Of these, 166 were alerts related to
job postings and led to similar pages on multiple domains
listing the same job; 23 led to multiple sites that hosted con-
tent related to the horoscope; 4 led to adult websites; and 6
were subscription welcome/thank you notifications. Notice
that while these 199 WPN messages may be benign, PushAd-
Miner helped us identify and characterize a large number of
additional WPN ads that are in fact malicious and were not
identified by URL blacklists such as VT or GSB. However,
our current system is not designed to be an automatic mali-
cious WPN ad detection system. In our future work, we plan
to leverage the lessons learned from the measurement results
obtained in this paper to investigate how malicious WPN
messages can be accurately detected and blocked in real time.
6.4 Ad Networks and Ad Blocking Effects
Figure 5 shows the distribution of WPN ads, including
malicious ones, per ad network. As it can be seen, many
of the ad networks we considered in our measurements are
abused to distribute malicious WPN ads.
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Figure 5: Distribution of WPNs w.r.t. Ad Networks
We also investigated whether ad blocker extensions used by
desktop browsers may be effective against WPN ads. Unfor-
tunately, because browser extensions have limited visibility
into Service Worker activities [5], they are currently unable
to mitigate the rise of WPN ads. For instance, we checked
the URLs of Service Worker scripts against the Easylist filter
rules [36] used by most popular ad blockers. Furthermore,
we installed two highly popular ad blocker extensions in our
Chromium browser and checked its blocking capability. As
shown in Table 4, both ad blocking mechanisms failed to
block the registration of Service Worker scripts related to
ad networks that support WPN ads, even though Easylist
was able to filter a small number (less than 2%) of network
requests subsequently issued by the installed Service Worker
scripts. This shows that existing methods are not sufficient
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to mitigate WPN-based ads, including malicious ones.
Table 4: Results on Existing Ad Blockers
No. of Blocked URLs
Service Worker
Scripts
Service Worker
Requests
Easylist Blacklist 0 out of 1187 132 out of 8031
AdBlockPlus Ad blocker 0 out of 884 0 out of 7276
AdGuard Ad Blocker 0 out of 895 0 out of 7520
7 Related Work
In this section, we discuss prior studies related to our work.
Service Workers and WPNs: Papadopoulos et al. [5]
propose multiple attack techniques to register malicious
Service Workers that can control a victim’s web browser (e.g.,
steal computation power for performing nefarious activities).
There exist other studies [37, 38] that demonstrate similar
attacks on Web Workers. Lee et al. [9] study the risks posed
by PWAs. For instance, they collect Service Worker scripts
from top-ranked website homepages and analyze the risks for
phishing due to the use of brand logos in push notifications.
They also found a number of push-based phishing attacks
that exploit WhatsApp and YouTube icons. Furthermore, they
also identify security flaws in the design of browsers and
third-party push notification libraries. Other works related
to Progressive Web Apps [39–41] focus on the performance
of PWAs in multiple environment and their energy usage.
Our study is different, because we focus on measuring the
use of WPN messages as an ad-delivery platform in general,
and on measusing abuse in WPN ads. To that end, we design
and implement an automated system to subscribe to, collect,
interact with, and analyze in-the-wild WPN messages on
both desktop and mobile platforms.
Analyzing Online Ads: A line of studies [23, 42, 43] is
dedicated to investigate the online advertisement ecosystem.
They trace the information passed between ad exchanges
and analyze the revenue collected using ads. Another body
of studies [44–53] focus on identifying traditional malicious
web advertisements and ad campaigns in both desktop and
mobile environments. Similarly, a recent study [8] reports
observations of social engineering attack campaigns delivered
through traditional web-based advertisements. Our work is
different, because we specifically focus on ads and malicious
ad campaigns delivered through WPN messages.
Online Scams and Ad Blockers: A number of ap-
proaches [54–56] have been proposed to study the
effectiveness of existing ad block techniques as well as
the various counter-measures used by ad providers to
circumvent ad blockers. Other studies [10, 32, 57] discuss
various online scam techniques and the prevalence of Internet
fraud. Although PushAdMiner does not focus on blocking
malicious ads or online scams, we demonstrate that existing
ad blocking techniques are not effective at defending against
malicious WPN ads.
8 Discussion and Limitations
Blocking Malicious WPN Ads: In Section 6.4, we showed
that existing popular ad blockers and filtering rules are not
effective at mitigating WPN ads, due to their limited visibility
on Service Worker activities. An exception is perhaps rep-
resented by a browser extension called AdBlaster [58], which
particularly claims to block WPN ads. However, AdBlaster
simply disables all push notifications, including benign non-
ad ones, which can obviously disrupt legitimate uses of WPN
messages. Although ourPushAdMiner system is not currently
designed to detect malicious WPN ads in a fully automated
way, we believe that the results from our study provide
useful insights into the malicious use of WPN ads that may
encourage and help the security research community to build
better defenses against the abuse of web push notifications.
Handling Permission Request Redirections: In this study,
we observed some websites that do not directly ask for
permission to send notifications to the browser. Rather,
they first create a dynamic JavaScript-based prompt that
mimics a browser permission request. If the user clicks on
the confirmation button, the site then redirects the user to
a new page where the true permission to send notifications
is asked through the browser’s permission request dialog.
It is possible that this two-step permission granting process,
though somewhat more cumbersome, may be used by some
websites to avoid a website being permanently blocked from
requesting notificiation permissions in the future, or to bypass
some other policy restrictions.
Our current version of PushAdMiner is not able to identify
“fake” JavaScript-driven permission requests invoked by
dynamic dialog boxes, and we therefore potentially miss to
collect WPN messages from websites that use the two-step
permission request mechanism described above. In our future
work, we plan to extend PushAdMiner by adding a module
that can automatically identify and interact with such dynamic
dialog boxes, for instance by leveraging machine learning
methods. This will allow us to collect additional WPN mes-
sages that can be analyzed by PushAdMiner’s data analysis
module without requiring any other significant changes.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how web push notifications
(WPNs) are being used to deliver ads, and measured how
many of these ads are used for malicious purposes. To enabled
this study, we developed a system calledPushAdMiner, which
allowed us to automatically collect and analyze 21,541 WPN
messages across thousands of different websites. Among
these, our system identified 572 WPN ad campaigns, for a
total of 5,143 WPN-based ads, of which 51% are malicious.
We also found that traditional ad-blockers and malicious
URL filters are remarkably ineffective against WPN-based
malicious ads, leaving a significant abuse vector unchecked.
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Appendices
Appendix A Meta-Clustering Graphs
Figure 6 provides two examples of meta clusters. Figure 6a
contains as a node cluster WPN-C1 from Figure 4, as well as
other 6 related WPN ad campaigns that are likely orchestrated
by the same operators. This meta-cluster contains many
known malicious WPN messages, and we therefore label
it as suspicious. By manual inspection, we verified that all
domains involved in this meta cluster host visually similar
malicious pages (e.g., online survey scam pages).
Figure 6b shows another example of meta-cluster, which
includes cluster WPN-C2 from Figure 4 as a node, along with
30 other related WPN ad clusters. In this meta-cluster, none
of the WPN clusters (i.e., the nodes) were initially labeled
as malicious by either VT or GSB. However, we manually
inspected all landing pages pointed to by WPN messages
including in the meta cluster, and we were able to confirm
that these are indeed malicious, in that they display fake
PayPal messages and alerts that lead users to survey scams
and likely phishing-related pages.
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Figure 6: Graphical Representation Examples of Meta Clusters
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